In this paper, we analyze the exercise behavior of warrant holders and its impact on warrant values. For this purpose, we propose a parametric model to describing the exercise volume of warrants and calibrate it to exercise data of 40 warrants from the German market. We find that few too-early exercises but also a significant number of too-late exercises occur. This observed exercise behavior results in warrant values that are more than three percent below those under the optimal exercise strategy for at-the-money warrants and the differences are even much higher for in-and out-of-the-money warrants.
Introduction
Although it is widely accepted that American call options are optimally exercised in one block, where the optimal exercise date is when the exercise value hits the call price for the first time, several studies provide evidence that the empirical behavior significantly differs from this rule. In studies presented by Diz/Finucane (1994) , Finucane (1997) , and Poteshman/Serbin (2003) the exercise data of different types of call options reveals that a large number of exercises occurs when -contrasting with the optimal strategy -the exercise value is below the market price of a call option.
Since investors are better off in this case by selling the call instead of exercising, these exercises are denoted as irrational exercises. Furthermore, an irrational exercise behavior can also occur when an optimal exercise date is missed by an investor.
However, in these studies data of outstanding non-exercised call options are not available such that this kind of irrational behavior is not further analyzed.
The exercise behavior of call options or corporate warrants, which are closely-related instruments, is especially important for the issuing firm. Since an exercise of warrants results in a cash inflow for the firm, a good prediction about the real exercise strategy supports the firm's cash flow planning. Moreover, knowledge of a suboptimal exercise strategy might open a gain potential for the firm if the proceeds from a warrant issue exceed the true value of the warrants under the suboptimal exercise strategy.
Despite the similarity between corporate warrants and call options, there are two fundamental differences associated with warrant exercises compared to call exercises. First, exercises of warrants rather than call options have side effects on both the value of the underlying and its future dynamics. This is because an exercise of some warrants increases the firm value by the exercise proceeds and the number of afterwards outstanding stocks. Therefore, the stock after an exercise is that of a firm that differs from that if no exercise had occurred. As a consequence of these complex effects from an exercise, block exercise is not necessarily an optimal strategy in equilibrium for warrants even though it is optimal for call options (see e.g. Emanuel (1983) , Constantinides (1984) , Spatt/Sterbenz (1988) , and Koziol (2002) ).
The second difference between warrant and call exercises concerns the number of outstanding instruments during their lifetime. While further call options can be written after the first issuance date, the warrant-issuing firm is prohibited to issue new warrants with the same security identification number afterwards. Therefore, knowing once the number of issued warrants, the observed exercise volume also indicates the proportion of the non-exercised warrants which can be examined further in contrast to call options. These two differences between warrants and call options speak for a separate analysis of warrants.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the exercise behavior of warrant holders and its impact on warrant values. Since the general decision to exercise a warrant is in principle similar to that of prepaying a mortgage, we present a warrant exercise model that is related to a mortgage prepayment model introduced by Stanton (1995) . Regarding exercise data of 40 warrants from the German market, which allow for exercises in 362 exercise periods, we estimate the required parameters of our models. Then, we use this exercise behavior to determine the warrant value from the perspective of the issuing firm and compare it with the value if investors followed the optimal strategy.
Our findings are that warrant exercises are characterized by few too-early exercises (relative to a theoretical market without frictions like transaction costs) and a significant number of too-late exercises. This observed exercise behavior results in warrant values for the issuing firms that are more than three percent below those under the optimal exercise strategy for in-the-money warrants and even much higher for out-of-the-money warrants.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe a parametric model to explaining the exercise volume and discuss its properties. The exercise data of warrants from the German market is presented in section 3. Section 4 analyzes the empirical exercise behavior by estimating and interpreting the required model parameters. The impact of the empirical exercise behavior on warrant values is quantified in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Modelling the Exercise Behavior

Standard Approaches
The standard approach in the warrant pricing literature to capturing the exercise behavior is to assume block exercise, i.e. all warrants are exercised at the same point in time or not at all. The advantage of this approach lies in the simple determination of the warrant values. However, block exercise is not the result of an equilibrium strategy. The problem with this approach is that in some cases it can be optimal for one particular investor to deviate from the common block decision, when all the others follow the block strategy. The reason for this incentive is that this particular investor might benefit from a higher stock return volatility which can be caused by the exercise of the others, such that the warrant value after the shift in volatility is higher than the exercise value.
For this purpose, Constantinides/Rosenthal (1984) describe a strategic game among warrant holders that represents perfect competition. Constantinides (1984) shows that there are always equilibrium warrant values in this anonymous, non-atomic game which coincide with those under block exercise, even though the equilibrium exercise strategy differs from the block strategy. Therefore, block exercise is no feasible concept to describe the exercise behavior, but it can be justified for valuation purposes for firms without additional debt outstanding. 1 The equilibrium strategy -which is also called unrestricted exercise -is a first reasonable concept to describing the exercise behavior. We note that even though the unrestricted exercise variant fully abstracts from any frictions like transaction costs and assumes homogenous equally informed investors (as it is standard for valuation models), it is capable to explain a sequential exercise strategy.
Parametric Model
These standard assumptions of the unrestricted exercise might not be valid in real world. For this purpose, we discuss the role of transaction costs associated with an exercise, the heterogeneity of investors, and the information symmetry next to
propose a more general model to explaining the exercise volume. In general, the explicit transaction costs to exercise a warrant, such as the fee for the order and the costs to contact the bank via phone, fax, internet etc., are low relative to the exercise value of a warrant that is supposed to be exercised. However, even if the exercise value after these explicit transaction costs is as high as the value of a non-exercised warrant, rational investors might strictly prefer not to exercise this warrant, because investors might be inactive and fear the effort required for an exercise. Examples for this effort are the time it takes the investors to complete and submit the order form. Due to these opportunistic costs, which can be interpreted as implicit transaction costs, it is rational for the investors to forgoe some exercise possibilities which seem to be advantageous without regarding these implicit costs.
Only if the warrant holders are compensated for their efforts by an exercise value that lies sufficiently above the value of the non-exercised warrant, an exercise is optimal for them. Of course, the required transaction costs consisting of explicit transaction costs and the opportunistic costs depend on the investors' preferences itself and are therefore investor-specific. This characteristic violates the assumption of homogenous investors. We note that in special cases the rational investor-specific transaction costs (for exercising the warrant and selling the obtained stock) might be negative. For example, if an investor already holds some warrants but wants to invest in stocks of this firm, it might be cheaper for this investor to receive stocks by exercising the warrants than by selling the warrants and buying stocks afterwards even though the warrant value is below the exercise value. In this case,
1 Koziol (2002) shows that the block assumption is not appropriate for warrant pricing purposes when firms have additional debt outstanding, because the equilibrium warrant values can differ substantially from those under block exercise and show remarkable different properties.
exercise is associated with low transaction costs, while the sale of warrants and purchase of stocks results in considerable transaction costs. Some studies such as Poteshman/Serbin (2003) characterize exercises resulting in an exercise value below the value of the non-exercised instrument as irrational behavior. In our setup these outcomes are the result of implicit transaction costs and therefore rational.
To capture the heterogeneity of investors, we consider G different groups of warrant holders who hold the m initially outstanding warrants. Each group is characterized by group-specific relative transaction costs P i with
An exercise can occur at discrete dates
Whenever the relative exercise premium π t of a warrant in time period t exceeds the transaction costs P i , an exercise is advantageous. The relative exercise premium π t is defined as
At this point, we note that we only need π t in our parametric model when the exercise value is positive. Nevertheless, this definition of the exercise premium has the advantage that π t is positive if and only if an exercise is optimal in the absence of transaction costs. In the last time period in which the warrant matures, π T equals one if the stock value is above the strike price, because the non-exercised warrant would expire worthless.
Another questionable assumption of the unrestricted exercise variant is the information symmetry among warrant holders. In real world some investors hold warrants even though they are not familiar with the optimal exercise strategy or the determination of the exercise premium. This effect results in exercises independent from the relation between the exercise value and the value of a non-exercised warrant that drives the exercise decision of rational investors. We will account for this behavior by regarding a market-independent proportion
of exercises from the still outstanding issue in each time period. The parameter λ is non-negative by assumption such that the fraction cannot become negative.
On the contrary, there might be investors who know how to optimally exercise these warrants but do not (want to) spend the time to observe and analyze the current market quotes at every feasible exercise date. Thus, we might expect some forgone exercise possibilities despite huge exercise premiums. We capture this property by assigning high transaction costs above one to the last group G. Since π t cannot exceed one, because the value of a non-exercised warrant cannot be negative, these investors will never decide to exercise for market reasons.
2
Next, we show how to determine the aggregate exercise volume k t and the relative exercise volume k t := kt m−kt related to the number of outstanding warrants m − k t := m − i<t k i using the exercise premium π t of a warrant and the frictions introduced above. This model adjusts a model introduced by Stanton (1995) , which was originally designed to describe mortgage prepayments.
In our model the initially outstanding m warrants are divided among the investors of the G groups. The numbers of warrants initially held by group j is denoted by g 0,j and the relative fraction of warrants in group j is g 0,j . Thus, the aggregation over all groups, G j=1 g 0,j and G j=1 g 0,j , amounts to m and one, respectively. The exercise volume k t,j of group j in time period t ranges from zero to g t,j . Accordingly, the relative exercise volume k t,j related to the volume of still outstanding warrants at the beginning of period t defined as
is also between zero and the relative fraction g t,j := g t,j m−kt of group j in period t. As a consequence, the total and the relative exercise volume amount from an aggregation over all groups:
Since a proportion of 1 − e −λ investors exercise even though the exercise value is negative or their transaction costs are above the exercise premium, while the other investors exercise their entire holdings, the relative exercise volume of every group in the initial period, t = 0, is
which results in the aggregated relative exercise volume k 0 = G j=1 k 0,j and the absolute exercise volume k 0 = k 0 · m. As a consequence of a potential exercise, the relative proportion of warrants g 1,j in every group after exercise might change.
Since mortgage loans rather than warrants cannot be carried forward to other mortgage takers, Stanton assumes in his model that every mortgage holder of a specific transaction cost class prepays the mortgage or remains in this class. Therefore, a change of the transaction cost class of any particular mortgage taker cannot occur.
As a consequence, a burn out effect takes place, because the mortgage holders with relatively low transaction costs prepay first such that the fraction of mortgage holders with relative high transaction costs increases with the mortgage's lifetime. If we adopted this assumption, it would mean for our warrant exercise model that trading between warrant holders of different transaction cost groups cannot take place and a particular warrant holder cannot change his or her personal transaction costs over time. Since warrant trades regularly take place, we should suppose that the transaction costs of the former and the current warrant holder do not necessarily coincide.
Thus, there might be warrants migrating from investors of a certain transaction cost group to other investors from different groups between two consecutive exercise periods. We account for these migrations by assuming that a proportion of η warrants remains in every group after exercise where the proportion of 1 − η is distributed over all G groups according to the initial weighting factors g 0,j . Therefore, we can write for the relation between the number g t,j of warrants in group j in period t and g t+1,j in the consecutive period for all t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1:
The first term denotes the number of the "migrating warrants" that are distributed to group j, because g 0,j is the initial group weight which is multiplied by the total number of "migrating warrants" (1 − η) G s=1 (g t,s − k t,s ). In addition, a proportion of η of the warrants in group j remains in this group which is indicated by the second term η · (g t,j − k t,j ). Then, the required relative number of warrants in period t + 1 held by group j is g t+1,j = g t+1,j m−kt . Using matrix notation, we can also write
This exercise procedure is repeated in every period. Given the relative fractions g t,j of warrants in every group in an arbitrary period t, the relative group-specific exercise volume reads
and results in the relative exercise volume aggregated over all groups, k t = G j=1 k t,j , and the absolute exercise volume, k t = k t · m − k t . Again, the required group weighting g t+1,j in the next iterative step follows from equation (1) . In an analogous way, we obtain the exercise volume for the succeeding periods until maturity T .
At this point, we knowingly admit not only values of η between zero and one but all real numbers. This assumption allows for a broader description of the exercise behavior. Though a negative η appears puzzling at first glance, we can think of it as follows. The number of warrants that in total migrate to group j after the exercise date t and before exercise in t + 1 is -according to equation (1) -equal to
we can see for η < 1 that if and only if the relative number g t,j −k t,j m−kt−kt of outstanding warrants immediately after exercise is lower than g 0,j , then the number of warrants that in total migrate to this group is positive. Since the groups with low transaction costs typically have a low relative fraction g t,j −k t,j m−kt−kt immediately after exercise because of relative high exercises k t,j , we find that groups with low transaction costs considerably increase their holdings at the costs of the groups with the higher transaction costs. The lower η, the higher the number of migrating warrants into or out of every group. Thus, a negative η means that the migration activity to the groups with low transaction costs is especially high.
If η is very low or higher than one, the group weighting g t,j and therefore the exercise volume k t,j would become negative which is unreasonable. A possibility to prevent these negative exercise volumes of a transaction cost group is the follow-
is negative, we reduce every group weighting by g min to exclude a negative g t,j . Then, we scale each weighting by the factor 1 1−G·g min such that the weighting factors sum to unity afterwards. Thus, in the case of an adjustment the group weighting g t,j read:
If this adjustment is made, every group weighting is linearly adjusted such that the group with the lowest weight will receive a weight equal to zero. Moreover, this adjustment accounts for the fact that those groups which would have a higher weight without the adjustment, will still have a higher weight even with the adjustment.
In the special case in which η is zero, the group weighting factors g t,j are constant over time and therefore the exercise volume k t follows from the number of outstanding warrants m − k t and does not require the path of exercises over time. We note that this case is a remarkable numerical simplification.
To reduce the number of required parameters, the initial weighting factors g 0,j result from a discretized version of a beta distribution. Thus, only two parameters, α > 0 and β > 0, which characterize the beta distribution are required instead of G group weighting factors. The reason for the use of the beta distribution is that this distribution function is very flexible and can attain several different shapes. We introduce a constant P min < P 1 as a shift of the beta distribution to allow for negative group-specific transaction costs. Otherwise, the beta distribution would only be defined for non-negative transaction costs. The expectation of the transaction costs for this shifted beta function and the corresponding standard deviation are given by:
Using the middle between two consecutive transaction costs as the bounds of the interval for the beta distribution that is relevant for the initial group weighting, we obtain g 0,j as follows:
N Beta (·; α, β) stands for the value of the beta distribution computed with the two parameters α and β.
Next, we analyze the properties of this model given the typical case that the adjustment (2) is not required as this allows for an intuitive application of the model. If η is above one, an adjustment will be always necessary and the number of warrants held by those groups with higher transaction costs might benefit from an exercise at the cost of those groups with lower transaction costs. This property can result in an aggregated exercise volume k t until time t that might decrease with lower initial transaction costs. In what follows and especially in the empirical examination, an unreasonable value of η above one will not play any role.
The core of the following analysis is to see how the aggregate k t , the relative k t , and the absolute exercise volume k t are impacted by a change of the model parameters.
We can see that the aggregated exercise volume k t until time t increases the lower the transaction costs of the considered groups in the initial period. In other words, the higher the relative number of warrants in a group with lower transaction costs at the cost of a group with higher transaction costs, the higher k t . However, the fact that k t increases with lower initial transaction costs does not mean that the relative exercise volume k t increases with lower initial transaction costs, too. This is because for η > 0, the model shows a "burn out" effect which means that after marketdependent exercises the group weighting factors of groups with higher transaction costs increase and those with lower transaction costs decrease. The reason for this burn out effect is that especially those investors with lower transaction costs exercise for market reasons such that the weight of these groups decreases after exercise.
As a consequence of these burn out effects, the relative exercise volume k t can decrease with lower transaction costs. An example in which k t decreases with lower transaction costs is when at time t = 0 no exercise would be optimal but an exercise for some groups is optimal with lower transaction costs. Then, in the case with lower transaction costs the burn out effect occurs after the first exercise date and a lower fraction of investors might exercise in future. In case of η ≤ 0,we have seen that especially those groups with lower transaction costs attract warrants after an exercise such that we have an "inverse burn out" effect then. In this case of η ≤ 0, the relative exercise volume clearly increases with the lower transaction costs.
Since the relative exercise volume k t can decrease with the initial transaction costs, the absolute exercise volume k t at a certain exercise date might also decrease with the initial transaction costs. The opposite and less intuitive effect, however, that k t can increase with the initial transaction costs might also hold. To illustrate this effect, we can consider the case that transaction costs are low and a high exercise volume occurs in the first period such that the absolute exercise volume in the succeeding periods is low afterwards. If higher initial transaction costs leaded to a lower prior exercise, the absolute exercise volume at a later exercise date can be higher when the exercise premium is sufficiently high.
Moreover, the higher the degree of market-independent exercise λ, the higher is the relative exercise volume k t and therefore the aggregated exercise volume k t , too.
As argued before, the absolute exercise volume k t in period t does not necessarily increase then.
A further property is that both the aggregated exercise volume k t and the relative exercise volume increase with a lower η. The intuition for this finding is that the lower η, the higher the fraction of warrants immediately after an exercise, (1 − η), that is distributed among all groups. Thus, the number of warrants that in total migrates to a group with low transaction costs from a group with high transaction costs is higher the lower η. We can think of (1 − η) as the degree with that warrants held by investors with high transaction costs are shifted to those with lower transaction costs after an exercise. Following this intuition, we can see why k t and k t increase when η decreases. The absolute exercise volume k t , however, does not necessarily increase with a lower η, because a higher k t can result in a lower k t as illustrated before.
3 The Data
Description
Though there are several databases which contain market prices of numerous traded securities, access to data about the exercise volume of corporate warrants in the course of their maturity is hardly available. Nevertheless, we were able to record the annualized exercise volume of 40 corporate warrants from the German market such that we can work with 362 yearly observations. To gain this data, we could access three different data sources.
The exercise data of the first source stems from internal documents provided by Deutsche Bank AG and Dresdner Bank AG. The internal documents comprise of individual exercise orders from their clients and bank-specific clearings. A problem is that a particular bank only has access to all exercises of a certain issue if this bank acts as the central office of this issue and the issue does not have taken place too long ago. In general, banks do not storage these documents anymore after the obligation period of ten years.
The second source of exercise data is provided by a study of Peterhans (1991) . This study contains many warrants for which the annual exercise volume is documented.
We include those warrants of this sample for which market prices of warrants and the underlying stock are also available. Otherwise, we cannot link these warrants to an exercise premium which is necessary to judge about the exercise behavior.
The third data source is the Hoppenstedt stock market guide which reports the balance sheets of all corporations of the German market. If a firm has only a warrant and no further instruments affecting the firm's stock capital outstanding at the same time, we can extract the annual exercise volume from changes of the capital stock. In some cases the firms' capital stock and the created conditional capital were broken down by the capital created from the particular warrant. Then, we could include these warrants, too.
For 34 of 40 warrants, we reliably have the annual exercise volume over the whole time to maturity. In six cases (88.82%, 98.60%, 98.51%, 84.65%, and 98.76%) we cannot be sure to have captured the whole exercises because the total exercise volume of the outstanding issue is significantly below the exercise volume of the other issues that ended deep-in-the-money. As a consequence of the fact that we might not have captured some exercises, we adjust the other exercises. We treat the non-exercised volume of these issues as exercises with the same shape as the observed ones. For this purpose, we scale each annual observed volume by a factor such that the total exercise volume corresponds to the initially outstanding issue. 3 For a further warrant the annual exercise volume in the last period 1992 is not documented by Peterhans.
Since this warrant is deep in the money at maturity we set the last exercise volume equal to the number of still outstanding warrants.
We obtained the daily market prices of the warrants and the underlying stock from the Karlsruher Kapitalmarktdatenbank (KKMDB). However, there are no market prices available for a warrant issued by Linde. Since the value of a warrant is supposed to be the difference between the cum-warrant bond and the ex-warrant bond, we take the differences of the warrant bonds to obtain a reasonable value for the market price of the embedded warrant. The warrant-bond prices were provided by the Mannheimer Anleihedatenbank. Moreover, we got access to German interest rate curve estimations. The interest rate curves were provided from the Chair of
Finance at the University of Mannheim.
The important parameter that drives the exercise decisions is the exercise premium which we have defined as the difference between the exercise value and the value of a non-exercised warrant related to the warrant's exercise value. Despite of the rigorous definition of the exercise premium, the practical determination of this quantity is not obvious for two reasons. The first problem is that we have warrant and stock prices for every trading day but the exercise premium in our model presented above refers to a whole period. We know that in a perfect world without frictions, transactions costs, and competitively held warrants, i.e. unrestricted exercise, the optimal exercise date can only lie immediately before an otherwise loss of a dividend claim. This means for the warrants of our sample that an exercise until the end of a business year (which is equal to the calendar year in these cases) is required to participate in the dividend payment of the succeeding year. In other words, if an investor does not exercise by the end of a year, she or he will forgoe the following dividend payment. Moreover, there is a blocking period for clearing reasons starting between Nov 30 to Dec 15 until the end of the year. Thus, the optimal exercise dates must lie immediately before the blocking period or at maturity. As a consequence, the relevant premature exercise premium for us is that determined immediately before the blocking period starts. The exercise premium at maturity is determined for the last exercise date.
Therefore, we have now one uniquely defined date per exercise period for which we need the exercise premium.
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The second problem associated with the determination of the exercise premium is that the value of a non-exercised warrant cannot be observed or obtained from market data at the relevant dates for the exercise premium, because it is only revealed after the optimal exercise date. If an exercise of a warrant is optimal, the warrant price immediately before the blocking period must be (in an arbitrage-and 4 Even if investors make their exercise decision some days before the last day before the blocking period at the end of a year starts, the stock price at the optimal exercise date is nevertheless a good proxy for the exercise premium that these particular investors intend to gain because the exercise premium does not rapidly move over time.
transaction-cost-free market) at least as high as the exercise value. After the beginning of the blocking period, the warrant does not contain the corresponding dividend right and is equal to the value of a non-exercised warrant then. In general, the warrant experiences a drop at the beginning of the blocking period if investors forgoe valuable exercise opportunities. As long as exercise is advantageous, we can think of the exercise premium as the drop of the warrant at the first date of the blocking period divided by the exercise value. Nevertheless, the exercise value at these dates is simply the difference between the stock and the strike price and can be therefore easily observed. We distinguish between two approaches, a market price-oriented and a model-oriented approach to capturing this drop:
(1) In the market price-based approach, we consider the realized exercise premium.
This means that we use the exercise values and values of warrants in the blocking period to compute the exercise premium. In particular, we take the arithmetic mean of all feasible daily relations The problem with this approach to determining the exercise premium is that the actual size of the premium is not available for the investors at their decision date immediately before the blocking period. Thus, when using this approach, we implicitly assume that investors have an estimation of the market behavior and know the premium already in advance.
(2) The second approach is model-oriented which means that the exercise premium 5 Due to the shortage of this period we abstract from interest rate costs.
is exclusively determined by parameters which are available at the exercise date immediately before the blocking period. Thus, the problem with the assumed foresight of the first approach is not in effect here. To find the exercise premium, we price the non-exercised warrant using the pseudo-American Black/Scholes formula.
In particular, we insert the stock price observed at the last trading day before the blocking period starts. Moreover, we consider a constant dividend yield which is equal to the last dividend payment divided by the considered stock price before the blocking period. The required volatility of the stock return is the empirical volatility computed for the time span from Jan 1 to the decision date which is close to the end of the year. The reason why we choose the empirical rather than an implicit volatility is that the empirical volatility is an objective measure that can be uniquely determined but an implicit volatility does not exist in all time periods for all warrants. The required interest rates to apply the Black/Scholes formula stem from interest rate curve estimations using German Bundesanleihen. Though the pseudo-American valuation is only an approximation, it is well-known that this approximation works reasonably well for the important cases in which the exercise premium is close to zero. In the other cases in which the exercise premium is very low (very high), only few investors exercise (do not exercise) according to our parametric model such that the exercise volume is not very sensitive for those exercise premia.
Predictability of Exercise Volume with Traditional Exercise Variants
A reasonable first step to do with our data about the empirical relative exercise volume k t and the related exercise premia π t is to check whether the traditional exercise variants for warrant pricing purposes, which we presented in section 2.1, are capable to explain the empirical behavior. The most important exercise variant is the block exercise which means that the empirical relative exercise volumes k t must always be zero or one. As we can see in table 1 and figure 1, in 58 cases from 362 observations in total there is a sequential exercise between three and 97 percent of the outstanding issue. Since these exercise volumes of this range can hardly be treated as a block decision, we have a considerable fraction of non-block exercises. This number becomes even more striking if we focus on the exercise periods characterized by a relative exercise volume above three percent. Then, in most cases, 58 out of 92, a sequential exercise rather than a block exercise takes place. These findings confirm the hypothesis that empirical exercises are not in one block.
Figure 1: Relative Exercise Volume
The diagram shows the empirical relative exercise volume k t as a function of the related exercise premium π t for the two approaches to determining the exercise premium. 
The rejection of the block assumption is not surprising, because -as we have mentioned above -the optimal exercise strategy of competitively held warrants does not correspond to the block strategy, but a sequential exercise volume might be optimal in some cases. The outstanding importance of the block exercise primarily stems from the ability to correctly price warrants rather than to determine their equilibrium exercise strategy. Under unrestricted exercise, which means that warrants are competitively held and the market is frictionless, the following strategy occurs in equilibrium:
Thus, a non-block exercise is optimal if the exercise premium π t equals zero. This strategy ensures that a particular investor without any price impact has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. Figure 1 shows that the empirical relative exercise volume is close to zero for negative exercise premia of both exercise approaches, while for positive exercise premia a nearly complete exercise occurs. For exercise premia close to zero, the exercise volume can attain values between zero and seventy percent. These raw observations are conform with the theory of the unrestricted exercise variant.
Using table 1, we can do a more detailed analysis. We consider the three events no exercise, sequential exercise, and complete exercise that characterize the equilibrium exercise strategy in the unrestricted case according to formula (3). Then, we count the number of positive and negative exercise premia π t record the ratio of positive exercise volumes. We differentiate between the market-(1) and the model-oriented (2) approach to determining the exercise premia. The numbers in brackets below the ratio indicate the 10% confidence interval of the corresponding estimate of the ratio. 6 That means the ratio of positive exercise volumes is significantly above the second value in brackets or significantly below the first value with a significance level of 5%. According to the theoretical strategy, π t is supposed to be negative (positive) in the case of no (a complete) exercise. If a sequential exercise occurs, our model predicts π t equal to zero. However, due to numerical reasons, π t in our sample never equals zero. For this reason, we expect a ratio of positive π t equal to 0.5, if the empirical exercise behavior is consistent with that predicted by theory.
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To avoid an examination of non-unique cases in which it is not clear whether the exercise volume k t should be interpreted as no or a sequential exercise, we exclude all exercise volumes between zero and three percent. Then, an exercise volume equal to zero must be characterized as no exercise. An exercise of more than three percent is supposed to be a sequential exercise, because it can hardly be explained as the result of such few unconscious exercises that we can still speak from no exercise. Moreover, we classify a relative exercise volume of more than 97 percent as a complete exercise.
By this classification, we want to prevent that a complete exercise except for few (non-rationally acting) investors is treated as a sequential exercise. In fact, our data sample shows that all exercise volumes either lie above 98.5 percent or far below 97 percent such that the exact fixing of the frontier between a sequential and a complete exercise is not crucial.
The table shows that in the case of a complete exercise, the unrestricted exercise strategy predicts the correct sign of π t in all 34 cases for both exercise premium approaches. Accordingly, the ratio of positive exercise premiums is as predicted by the unrestricted exercise variant close to zero when no exercise occurs. In nine or two cases with no exercise which is even less than four or one percent, there is a positive empirical exercise premium according to approach (1) or (2). The fraction of correct signs of the exercise premium is significantly above 1 − 0.0685 = 0.9325 or 1 − 0.0276 = 0.9734. Thus, we have evidence that in more than 93.25 or 97.34 Given a sequential exercise, the ratio 0.7242 of positive exercise premiums due to approach (1) is significantly higher than the target value 0.5. Therefore, the ratio of positive exercise premiums according to approach (1) is relatively too high to explain the theoretical unrestricted exercise. Thus under the assumption of symmetrically distributed realized exercise premiums, this finding reveals that a sequential exercise might result in a positive mean of exercise premiums instead of a zero mean premium.
Therefore, the exercise incentive is lower than predicted by the unrestricted exercise variant. If we apply approach (2) to determining the exercise premiums we still find a ratio of 0.5518 higher than the target value 0.5 but it does not significantly differ from 0.5 anymore. As a consequence, the ratio of positive exercise premiums under approach (2) in the case of sequential exercise still suggests a too low exercise incentive compared to the theory, but we cannot reject the unrestricted exercise anymore. These observations reveal that the empirical exercise behavior partly captures the properties of the unrestricted exercise variant but we also find evidence that this theory cannot fully explain the empirical exercises.
Properties of Empirical Exercise Volume
The examination of the empirical exercise volume in the previous subsection has
shown that there might be a tendency for a too conservative exercise incentive, even though we cannot always reject the unrestricted exercise variant. For this reason, we control for other parameters that might affect the exercise volume. As under the unrestricted exercise variant, the exercise premium π t is supposed to be a parameter that primarily drives the exercise volume. To account for a "burn out" effect which is in effect in our parametric model for 0 < η < 1, we include the total prior exercise volume kt m related to the total number of issued warrants and the warrant's age t in the regression. According to the burn out effect, the exercise volume is supposed to decrease with the prior exercise volume and accordingly the warrants' age. To control for the fact that warrants of large firms are exercised in a different way than warrants issued by small firms we include the log of the market capitalization of the correspondent issuer. Since generally the stocks of big firms play a more important role on capital markets than those of small firms, institutional investors rather observe and analyze these big firms. As a consequence, if a valuable exercise possibility of a firm appears, it is more likely that it is exploited when the concerning firm is big. Therefore, we expect that the bigger the warrant issuer, the higher the exercise volume. Moreover, we examine whether the exercise decisions change over time because warrant holders are becoming more and more experienced in terms of the exercise of warrants. Therefore, we consider the year of warrant issue in our regression. These considerations result in the following estimation equation: Table 2 reports the results of the OLS regression (4) for both approaches to computing the exercise premium. The first value indicates the estimator of the corresponding coefficient in the regression. The numbers below in brackets denote the confidence interval at the 5% level and the third number stands for the standard error. The results of the regression show that -conform with our expectationsa higher exercise premium π t is related to a higher relative exercise volume k t . In the case of the second approach to determining π t , the coefficient is even significant. The positive signs of the coefficients α 2 and α 3 , which are significant for both π t -approaches, indicate that the exercise incentive increases the older the warrant and the more warrants have been exercised before. This observation contradicts the hypothesis that there is a burn out effect in the empirical warrant exercises. It can rather be interpreted as a reversed burn out effect or an exercise accelerator caused by prior exercises or increasing age of the warrants. Moreover, the market capitalization of a firm does not significantly affect the exercise volume as the coefficient α 4
indicates. Furthermore, we observe that later issued warrants have a significantly higher exercise volume. This observation might be evidence for the fact that the exercise policy of warrant holders has changed in the course of the time.
Analysis of Empirical Exercise Volume
In this section, we calibrate our model by estimating the corresponding parameters such that the sum of the squared differences between the empirical and the modelpredicted relative exercise volume k t is minimized. We differentiate between an estimation using the full data sample and an estimation with two subsamples.
Analysis of Full Sample
The results of the estimation using the full sample are reported in table 3 where the numbers in brackets indicate standard errors. For the computations in this estimation and in all further examples throughout this paper, we consider G = 10 different groups of transaction costs with the following transaction costs P min = −0.14, P 1 = −0.07, P 2 = −0.03, P 3 = −0.015, P 4 = 0, P 5 = 0.015, P 6 = 0.03, 
Analysis of Subsample Periods
As suggested by table 2, the empirical exercise behavior might have changed over time. To analyze this effect and to further show the robustness of our model, we estimate our model for two subsamples. The first subsample contains the 20 warrants which were issued first, where the second subsample consists of the twenty latest warrant issues from our whole sample with 40 warrants. The results are shown in Though the estimates for the subsamples differ from those for the whole sample, the general structure of our model describing the subsamples is the same as that which explains the whole sample. The mean and the standard deviation of the initial transaction costs are positive, the market-independent exercises captured by λ are not significant, and the proportion of warrants, η, that remains in the former transaction cost group, is negative which again implies an inverse burn out effect.
The sum of squared errors of the relative exercise volume for the two subsamples 1.25 + 2.26 = 3.51 and 1.01 + 0.93 = 1.95, respectively, is close the corresponding sum for the whole sample 3.57 and 2.02. Therefore, we can see that the estimates for the whole sample reasonably explain both the exercises of the first 20 issues in subsample 1 and the later 20 issues in the second subsample. This finding is evidence for a certain robustness of our estimates.
If we use the estimates of the first sample to compute the sum of squares for the 
General Properties of the Exercise Behavior
As a result of the empirical analysis, we find the following behavior of warrant holders.
Transaction Costs
The estimates of the mean of the initial transaction cost distribution are always positive for both the whole sample and the subsamples and are even significant in several cases. This outcome indicates that investors have on average positive transaction costs that force them to exercise too late relative to the theoretical optimal behavior without transaction costs. On the contrary, there is a considerable number of investors facing negative transaction costs. According to the estimates under the two exercise premium approaches, the proportion of those investors is 10.1 percent for the first approach and even 16.4 percent for the second one. Negative transaction costs -as discussed above -can possibly stem from the desire to hold stock of the firm that issued the warrants instead of the warrants themselves. If the exercise value is below the value of a warrant, selling the warrants and buying stock afterwards can result in relatively high additional costs such that exercising the warrants is advantageous for these investors. This case explains why it can be optimal to exercise when the exercise value is below the warrant value such that negative transaction costs rationally exist.
The observation that all standard deviations are significantly positive (at the one percent level) implies that investors have heterogenous transaction costs. Therefore, it is in fact necessary to consider different transaction cost-specific groups.
Market-independent Exercise
The market-independent exercises, which are governed by the parameter λ, have no essential importance. The estimates of these parameters are always insignificant and close to zero. An explanation for the inferior importance of λ is that investors can sell the warrants to cash their position instead of an unfavorable exercise. Primarily irrational investors, who do not understand the optimal exercise decision, might exercise when the market values do not support this decision.
Burn Out Effect
A burn out effect, which is commonly observed in the prepayment of mortgage backed securities, means that after some exercises the exercise incentive of the remaining warrant holders decreases. The intensity of a possible burn out effect is captured by the parameter η which measures the proportion of warrants that migrate to another group. Since η is significantly negative, we find a reversed burn out effect, because the more warrants are exercised by a group with low transaction costs the higher their subsequent relative group weighting. As an explanation for this effect, we can argue that investors with low transaction costs who benefited from a favorable exercise strategy in the past especially buy further warrants to exploit again their optimal strategy or that the other investors who have recognized favorable exercises in the past develop a more offensive exercise incentive resulting in a migration to a group with lower transaction costs.
Considered Exercise Premiums for Exercise Decision
We proposed two approaches for the exercise premium which is a major parameter for the investors' optimal exercise decision. The first approach (1) depends on the ex post realized premium which the investors cannot observe at the potential exercise date. The second approach (2) exclusively uses observable parameters and provides exercise premiums based on an option pricing model. As for our parametric model the second approach results in a better explanation of exercise volumes, we see that the warrant holders might rather regard exercise premiums arising from a model for their exercise decision instead of exploiting a potential foresight about the premiums that will be realized in future.
Stability of Exercise Behavior over Time
As a comparison of the analysis of the whole data sample and a subdivision of the whole sample in a former subsample and a later subsample indicates, our model reflects the exercise behavior over the whole sample reasonably well which does not provide evidence for a regime switch in warrant exercises. In particular, an out-ofthe-sample test shows that estimates obtained from the first 20 issues are capable to explain the exercises within the later 20 warrants.
Valuation of Warrants under the Empirical Exercise Behavior
In this section, we determine the value of the warrants from the perspective of the issuing firm. The value of the warrants in this case essentially depends on the real exercise behavior of the warrant holders rather than the theoretically optimal strategy. Whenever the real exercise volume differs from the optimal one, the warrant value for the firm is lower than under the optimal strategy. We account for the real exercise behavior by assuming that the parametric model and its corresponding estimates, which were obtained in the previous sections, perfectly reflect the behavior of the warrant holders.
Model Framework for the Valuation
The model framework for the valuation of warrants has the same time structure as the parametric model. During the time to maturity from time zero to T , there are T +1 periodical exercise dates, t = 0, 1, ..., T at which one warrant can be exchanged into a newly created stock by paying the strike price E.
The value of a stock S t at every non-exercise date follows a geometric Brownian
where µ and σ denote the instantaneous mean and standard deviation of the return of the stock value and z t is the value of a standard Wiener process. A proportional dividend equal to δ · S t is paid at every exercise date. An exercise of a warrant results in the following exercise value
which also contains the dividend payment δ · S t . Therefore, the stock value immediately subsequent to any exercise date experiences a drop by the the dividend payment and thereafter follows again the Brownian motion until the next dividend payment.
We note that both the stock value and its statistical distribution, which is characterized by the geometric Brownian motion, are independent of the exercise strategy followed by the warrant holders. In some cases, firm value models that explicitly account for a dilution from an exercise are used to price warrants rather than stock value frameworks. Nevertheless, the specified stock value model is consistent with a firm value framework under two conditions. First, the number of outstanding warrants m is neglectable relative to the number of outstanding stocks, and second, the firm has no further claims outstanding, such as credit-risky debt, that depends on the exercise strategy and results in wealth transfers from or to the stock holders when exercises occur. In this special case, the whole firm is such large that the existence of the warrants and their exercise do not affect the other outstanding corporate securities.
In addition, we assume that the market prices W th t for which an investor can alternatively sell her or his non-exercised warrants immediately after an exercise date are those resulting from the optimal future exercise strategy. This assumption appears surprising because we also consider transaction costs that impact the real exercise strategy. However, we only say that there are some investors such as banks or other institutional investors who almost bear no transaction costs when following the optimal strategy. If these investors clear the markets such that they cannot achieve arbitrage opportunities from their lower, neglectable transaction costs, the warrant prices must equal the prices under the optimal exercise strategy. It is nevertheless not irrational for the other investors with positive transaction costs to invest in warrants at these prices, because these investors are always exposed to additional costs when buying and selling an investment.
Under this assumption that the exercise policy does not impact the stock value, the optimal exercise strategy is the block strategy.
8 As a consequence, the theoretical value of a non-exercised warrant W th t is a unique function of time t and the stock value S t which can be determined efficiently by various lattice approaches. The exercise premium π t (for the relevant cases in which the exercise value S t − E is positive)is given by
Thus, knowledge of the stock value also implies knowledge of π t .
To incorporate the real exercise behavior of the warrant holders, we use the estimates from the approach with model-based exercise premiums because the explanatory power was better than for the other approach. In particular, we assume that the exercise volume is a deterministic function resulting from this specification of our model as a function of time t and the stock value S t .
The real exercise volume k real t is uniquely given by the stock values § t at the current and former exercise dates. Whenever such a sequence of stock values, § 0 , § 1 ,..., § τ is known, the exercise volume and the corresponding group weighting factors arise from a forward induction as presented in section 2:
As a consequence, the value of a warrant W 
where E Q 0 denotes the expectation under the equivalent martingale measure Q such that the stock value S t divided by the money market account e r·t has zero drift in every non-exercise date. As a result, the impact of the real exercise behavior on the warrant value as a percentage of the theoretical warrant value is
where the theoretically optimal warrant value W * 0 is the maximum of W th 0 and the exercise value S t − E. This percentage is always positive, because the warrant value under the real exercise strategy cannot exceed the warrant value under the optimal, value-maximizing strategy. This value is obtained by a Monte Carlo simulation.
Analysis of the Impact of Empirical Exercise Behavior on the Value of Warrants
In this section, we consider the difference between the warrant value under theoretically optimal exercises and under the empirical exercises as a percentage of the warrant value under the optimal strategy. We can interpret the warrant value under the real exercises as the value of a claim that the firm writes with a warrant issue.
Thus, the considered percentage
indicates in how far a firm benefits from a warrant issue when exercises are according to those observed empirically rather than to the optimal strategy. We recall that the real exercises were characterized by very few exercises independent from the exercise premium, some exercises even for a negative exercise premium, and positive average transaction costs that result in relatively too less exercises when the premium is positive. higher than 25% and for deep-in-the-money warrants the difference is also slightly higher again. We can explain this typical shape as follows.
Whenever the value from a non-exercised warrant differs severely from its exercise value, the difference between warrant values is high because of the empirical exercise behavior. When exercises occur for low stock values, the firm saves the future obligation from the warrant, which can be considerable even for at-the-money warrants, but the exercise value is relatively low.
When the stock value is very high, the value of a non-exercised warrant is lower than the exercise value because of the dividend advantage. Therefore, the fact that few investors do not exercise despite of high exercise premiums results in an increasing difference of warrant values.
For medium stock values, the exercise value and the value of a non-exercised warrant are similar such that the difference of warrant values is lowest for these stock values.
Impact of Volatility
We can see in figure 2 that the difference even increases with the volatility σ of the stock return for at-the-money warrants, but it decreases for out-of-and deep-intothe-money warrants. The higher σ, the more distant the stock value at the future exercise dates from the current stock value, in general. Thus, an at-the-money warrant has a higher probability to become an out-of-or deep-into-the-money warrant when σ rises, which results in a higher difference of warrant values. Conversely, an out-of-and deep-into-the-money warrant have a higher probability to become an at-the-money warrant for which the differences are smaller. This rationale explains the effect of σ on the differences.
Impact of Dividend Rate δ In the example of figure 3 , the difference for at-the-money warrants increases with the dividend rate δ. Even in the absence of dividends for which no premature exercise is optimal, the difference is more than two percent due to premature exercises arising from market-independent exercising or investors with negative transaction costs. For a high dividend rate equal to ten percent, the difference can achieve a considerable magnitude above 25 percent. The intuition for the fact that the difference increases with δ is as follows. The higher δ, the higher the incentive to exercise because the value of a non-exercised warrant decreases with δ. As the real exercise behavior exhibits too late exercises, a higher dividend means that more valuable exercise opportunities are foregone by investors and therefore the difference is higher.
However, if the warrant differences are primarily determined by market-independent exercises because the exercise premium is negative and low, then the effect of marketindependent exercises declines with δ because a higher δ results in a lower value of a non-exercised warrant. Therefore, for deep-out-of-the-money warrants, the difference can also decrease with δ. The higher the time to maturity T , the higher the differences between the warrant values. This property is exhibited in figure 4 . We can see in this figure that for maturities above four years the difference is above two percent. The rationale for this outcome is straightforward. The more exercise dates, the more possibilities for real exercises that differ from the optimal strategy which results in a higher difference.
Impact of Time to Maturity
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the exercise behavior of warrant holders and its impact on warrant values. For this purpose, we propose a model which explains the exercise volume by introducing investors with heterogenous transaction costs, marketindependent exercises, and warrant migrations between investors of different transaction cost groups. The application of this model to empirical exercises of 40 warrants from the German market shows that our model explains empirical exercises reasonably well, where on average the model-predicted relative exercise volume differs by less than ten percentage points from the observed volume. Consistent with other studies regarding call option exercises, we observe some warrant exercises despite exercise values below the warrant value. Moreover, the real exercise behavior is characterized by premature exercises that on average require a positive exercise premium. This exercise behavior has a high relevance for firms issuing warrants in terms of their financial planning and for the specification of the real value of outstanding warrants. As a result of the exercise behavior that differs from the optimal strategy, the value of a warrant from the perspective of the issuing firm is lower under the observed exercise behavior than under the optimal strategy. This observed exercise behavior results in warrant values that are more than three percent below those under the optimal exercise strategy for at-the-money warrants and the differences are even much higher for in-and out-of-the-money warrants.
The presented parametric model to describing the empirical exercise behavior opens opportunities for further applications. Due to the high similarity between warrants and e.g. convertible bonds, this model can be analogously used to capture the conversion behavior of convertible bond holders. Analyzing data of convertible bond conversions if available, we expect similar findings for these instruments.
